Like a giant oil tanker, the world is turning. New growth poles of the world economy have been emerging in the south and east. Globalization once belonged to the west and now the tables are turning. We have entered the era of the 'rise of the rest'. Western media and politics of representation have celebrated the rise of the west for two hundred years, how then do they represent the rise of the rest? The main trends are that the rise of the rest is ignored, or represented as a threat, or celebrated in business media as triumphs of the marketplace. Media echoing free market ideology have contributed to vast wealth polarization; representing the rise of the rest as threat contributes to global political polarization; recycling the 9/11 complex produces cultural and political polarization; and overusing celebrity narratives contributes to existential polarization. These are the global divides discussed in this paper. In the wake of the economic crisis of 2008 there have been marked changes in discourse and a new motif has taken shape: recruiting the rest to rescue the west.
Introduction
In the buildup to the Iraq war mainstream media were asleep at the wheel. Mesmerized by the 9/11 attacks and the machinations of power, mainstream media, particularly in the US and UK, allowed the Iraq war to unfold and placed no obstacles in its course. This is widely discussed; here let us consider other media contributions to creating or sustaining global divides. I focus on the following: echoing free market ideology, representing the rise of the rest as threat, recycling the 9/11 complex, and overusing celebrity as narrative. 1 The setting of this discussion is that we are in a dramatic vortex. Like a giant oil tanker, the world is slowly turning. The emerging centers of the world economy and world society are in the south and east. Globalization once seemed to belong to the west and now the tables are turning. We have entered the era of the 'rise of the rest' -in an economic sense in that industries and multinationals in the south play an increasingly important role; in a financial sense with a view to sovereign wealth funds; in a policy and political sense, in international trade policy and the G20; but less so in a cultural sense. 2 Western media and representations have celebrated the rise of the west for some two hundred years, how then do they address the rise of the rest?
The main trends are that the rise of the rest is ignored because it doesn't fit national narratives in the west, or is represented as a threat because it fits or extends existing enemy images, or is celebrated in business media as triumphs of the marketplace. A summary headline version of this argument might run: western media complacent, display west-bias. In frequently representing twenty-first century globalization as a source of risk, western media exemplify western privilege and conservatism. Downstream, as mainstream media ignore the rise of the rest, they reinforce the relations between the rest and the rest, rather than between the rest and the west, and may thus contribute to the creeping irrelevance of the west. Table 1 gives a précis of the main arguments. The treatment follows the sequence of these arguments. Recycling the 9/11 complex is part of a wider problematic of representing war, to which I also devote a brief section. The emphasis in this discussion is on western mainstream media; in a closing section I make brief observations on the way media in the global south represent contemporary trends in globalization. The article closes with a reflection on representations before and after the crisis of 2008.
Free Market Paradox
I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, was such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders. (Alan Greenspan, US Congress, October 2008) In his last published article Jan Ekecrantz (2007) urges media studies to pay more attention to economic inequality and the role of media in sustaining and representing inequality. An immediately pressing question is, after decades of echoing and worshiping 'market forces', now that the 'free market' goes kaput, now what? For years western media passed on the admonitions of the free market gospel, the Nobel Prize winning economists of the Chicago school, the stipulations of the IMF and World Bank and the tropes of the Washington consensus -don't intervene in the market, rollback government, liberalize, privatize, lift capital controls, the free market and democracy go together. When crisis hit developing countries IMF conditions invariably stipulated cutting government spending. Since 2008 everything is topsy-turvy. Crises are supposed to take place in developing countries and to serve as instruments to discipline and punish the periphery and its unruly elites. Now financial crisis hits the United States and Europe -it is regarded as the most serious crisis since the Depression -and by mid 2008 the same economists who counseled liberalization and market shock therapy for developing and post-communist countries -such as Larry Summers and Jeffrey Sachs -plead for American government spending and large public works programs to stimulate the economy.
For decades people were told that the free market is superior, is the only viable economic model, there is no alternative -but now that the 'free market' is in trouble, sovereign wealth funds rescue Wall Street power houses. State capitalism -declared old fashioned and ineffective by the western establishment's power/knowledge grid -comes to the rescue as the free market goes down the toilet. According to Martin Wolf, the day the US government bailed out Bear Stearns with $30 billion, was 'the day the dream of global free market-capitalism died'.
Remember Friday March 14 2008 : it was the day the dream of global free marketcapitalism died. For three decades we have moved towards market-driven financial systems. By its decision to rescue Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve, the institution responsible for monetary policy in the US, chief protagonist of free-market capitalism, declared this era over. It showed in deeds its agreement with the remark by Joseph Ackermann, chief executive of Deutsche Bank, that "I no longer believe in the market's self-healing power". Deregulation has reached its limits. … The US is showing the limits of deregulation… we must start in the right place, by recognising that even the recent past is a foreign country. (Wolf, 2008) Since then there have been many days like that. In the course of 2008, with bailouts climbing to $700 billion and on to trillions, those seem days of innocence. There go the banks, the hedge funds, the rating agencies, the boards and for that matter, the business pages -each led by the smartest people in the room, now queuing up at the exit. One may cherish the irony of this historical twist, but it is do-it-yourself irony because media rarely concede the u-turn and appear oblivious to the gaping contradiction between 25 years of propagating the 'free market' and the u-turn of 2008. If you like world history, 2008 and 2009 are good years.
By echoing free market rhetoric unhindered, media have contributed to massive, unprecedented transfers of wealth within countries and on a global scale, a vast wealth polarization in which, according to UNDP figures, some 350 billionaires own as much as half the world population (UNDP 1994; Nederveen Pieterse 2004) . Through 25 years of free market propaganda media have been dozing at the wheel and under the heading of trickle down have enabled or permitted the rapid and steep growth of inequality within and between societies. However, should we not concede that social inequality is nowadays mostly caused by technological change, which brings about skills differentials, and by the effects of globalization? Not per se. It is possible to combine innovation and economic dynamism and equity. Contrast Scandinavia, Nordic Europe and East Asia with the US, UK and the developing countries that underwent structural adjustment. Technological change does not cause inequality; political change does.
One might argue, too, that when banks, boards, rating agencies, hedge funds and analysts all lost marbles because they miscalculated risk, how could media have done better? The point is, however, that by falling in line with propaganda and joining the free market bandwagon and by failing to inculcate civic vigilance, media contributed to a climate of lax regulation and permissive capitalism which, in turn, fostered creative accounting and corporations making the quarterly numbers by cooking the books. In time this set of processes produced the Enron and Anderson series of corporate scandals (2001), the subprime mortgage crisis (2007) and the financial and economic crisis of 2008.
To the extent that business media are an exception in representing the rise of the rest in a positive light, they tend to display a different bias: 'what is good for market forces is good for society'. When the west was winning, when it drove and 'owned' globalization, free market stories sounded acceptable and attractive. The world is flat and outsourcing is beneficial in the end. Now it appears it has all been bubbles all along -the high tech bubble, dotcom bubble, easy money bubble, real estate bubble, consumer credit bubble, merger and acquisitions bubble, the petrol and commodities bubbles, and now the bailout and economic stimulus bubbles. Media followed and fed each of these bubbles.
This includes the role of media as market forces. Media play a major role in market development. Hugo Slim, the world's wealthiest man, made his fortune in Mexico's telecoms. Thaksin Shinawatra made his fortune by selling computers to Thailand's police force and then became a telecom magnate. Berlusconi is Italy's media tycoon and Bill Gates' wealth is well known. Dan Schiller has discussed the role of media and telecoms in the era of digital capitalism (1999) as did Susan Strange (1996) . The deregulation of American telecoms in the nineties was a major contributor to the financialization of the US economy (Phillips 2006) and to the Wall Street frenzy that, in time, produced the Enron and WorldCom scandals. All along media, of course, are major political forces as well. Conrad Black maintained links with rightwing think tanks. Rupert Murdoch's media have contributed to pro-market propaganda. American media are deeply wired into the military-industrial-media complex. 3 The paradox of liberalization is that under the banner of the 'free market', market forces have been cast as panacea. Business media and accounts such as Thomas Friedman's (2005) have attributed the rise of Asia, China and India to liberalization; to Deng's modernization in China in 1981 and India's financial liberalization in 1991. Likewise the World Bank attributed the 'East Asian miracle' to export orientation and economic liberalization. Let me make some brief points in relation to this account.
This narrative overlooks the role of the public sector. In each of these cases the developmental state played a fundamental role in establishing the conditions that made market growth possible, from education, infrastructure and land reform in East Asia to Mao's reforms in China and Nehru's reforms in India. This is typically being ignored in Anglo-American free enterprise accounts of economic success. Washington orthodoxy is about paradigm maintenance, as Robert Wade shows (1996 , 2002 .
'Freedom' has historically been a language of power and a doctrine of hegemons (Wallerstein 1984) so the free market is a doctrine of winners. Now winners are becoming losers and the discourse and policies shift to protectionism. This leads to strange headlines such as 'Obama vows to help restore US faith in globalization' (Financial Times, June 27, 2008) . The article deals, of course, with trade policy and the then senator's criticisms of Nafta; yet since he is also 'a free trader', he seeks to 'improve Nafta. ' As the new industrialization in the global south produces a commodities boom, including high petrol prices, high commodity prices have a relatively equalizing impact in the world economy, as during the postwar economic boom. Western representations zero in on the downside of these trends. Thus, according to Thomas Friedman, the 'first law of petro politics' is 'that the price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions'. Cases that prove his point are Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria and Russia (Friedman 2006) . Aside from criticisms of Hugo Chávez, the message between the lines is that Friedman treasures the American way and bemoans the growth of state capitalism. But the selection of cases is biased. If oil states support American policies, such as Saudi Arabia, petro politics poses no problem (see Vitalis 2006) ; the problem, rather, is unruly petro politics. Besides, with the hindsight of 2008, freedom and the American way take on different meanings.
Goldilocks Globalization Changed Place
According to opinion surveys in the nineties, people in the west generally felt that the pace of globalization was just right -not too fast, not too slow. However, according to a Pew survey in 2007, 57 percent in G7 countries feel that the pace of globalization is 'too fast', whereas the majority in the global south deems its pace just right. 4 Thus, Goldilocks globalization has changed places.
In the nineties the global south felt threatened and overwhelmed by globalization. The risks of liberalization and financial crisis were real enough and culminated in the 1997 Asian crisis. Into the twenty-first century, advanced countries feel threatened by job loss and, in the US, by mounting trade and external deficits. According to populist views, competition from the south threatens job loss and undermines prosperity in the west. What mainstream media do not discuss, however, is the comparison between western countries: why are Scandinavia, Germany and other parts of Europe able to combine innovation, economic dynamism and a welfare state, whereas the US and UK are not. Decades of private sector underinvestment in American plants, technologies and innovation is the other side of the story that is lost (discussed in Nederveen Pieterse 2008a).
In American media, the problem has long been, rather, China and its undervalued renminbi, its cheap exports, its excessive savings, its thirst for commodities and energy. Complaints about China's currency run from media to congress and the treasury and make a policy point: forcing upon China a similar devaluation of its currency as Japan accepted in the 1985 Plaza Accord, which made Japan's exports to the US much less competitive. China's has learned Japan's lesson. By end 2008 US pressure on China to devalue its currency has still come to naught. China bashing signals a shift: in the nineties China's vast growing consumer market was a dream come true for western multinationals; in the 2000s it is treated as a threat. China is criticized for its human rights record and for increasing its military spending. After the crisis, in the course of 2008, the discourse in some respects shifts again (discussed below). The underlying script change is that the drivers and winners of globalization, particularly during the closing decades of the twentieth century, are becoming losers in the twenty-first century. At issue, of course, are not merely representations but also policies. Not just attitudes and media, but also policies are changing -advanced countries that used to push free trade now opt for protectionism, not just in agriculture but also in manufactured goods.
A further twist is the idea that the rise of the rest threatens the global environment. The rise of middle class consumption standards for growing numbers in China, India, Brazil and other developing countries competes with resource use and consumption standards in the west. Indulge for a few hundred years in uncontrolled modernization and then cast the rise of the rest as a threat to planetary survival. Four percent of the world population in the United States has been absorbing 40 percent of the world's resources -and now the consumption of rising middle classes in developing countries is viewed as a threat to the global environment.
The 9/11 Complex
In academia and social science Eurocentrism has been taken to the cleaners by Edward Said, Samir Amin and in postcolonial studies; 5 but it has made a comeback in media and politics, particularly in relation to Islam. In history and art the contributions of Islam to science and civilization as a broad and early cosmopolitanism have been increasingly widely recognized; but in western political discourse the 'clash of civilizations' prevails.
The 9/11 complex has turned into a western cul de sac. Go to Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, in fact to most of the world and the American and west European obsession with the Middle East and Islam just doesn't exist. This is the west's special front seat in the gallery of paranoia. Everything to do with Islam and the Middle East is tainted with threat. In 2008 the number of terrorism suspects on American security lists exceeds a million.
War-on-terror tunnel vision homogenizes Islam and treats Islam as threat. This is a boon for security experts, for terrorism is the successor to the cold war; for rightwing parties -who also have to make do without a communist enemy; and for western media -for media love a ready-made narrative. As Abrahamanian (2003) points out, American media have without fail interpreted 9/11 through the lens of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations perspective.
Media such as Copenhagen's Jyllands-Posten and Charlie Hebdo in Paris have volunteered to serve as frontiers in this clash of civilizations. Mainstream media follow or allow rightwing populist trends in the west, notably in Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, Austria and the US. These trends merge anti-immigrant sentiment, denigration of Islam and ignorant or hostile images of the global south. The Pim Fortuyn ('the Netherlands is full') and Ayaan Hirsi Ali strands recycle Orientalism. 6 Italian media in 2008 have scapegoated and targeted Roma people. At times manufacturing or cultivating these cultural tensions serves to distract attention from political and economic transformations or geopolitical objectives. Anti-immigrant sentiment in the US and Europe is another expression of globalization worries. For some time, immigration has been a flashpoint of global inequality, an intersection of western labor demand, border controls and global inequality.
The clash of civilizations is an imagined clash, or a political scenario masquerading as cultural friction. Apply double standards to the Middle East for decades (the official terminology is the 'roadmap to peace') and eventually it boomerangs, especially since the region is also the recipient of major petrol revenues. The clash of civilizations is a self fulfilling prophecy. View the world through lenses of perverse Orientalism and the Middle East hits back. Some argue that attacks on Islam such as the Danish cartoons may serve to deflect attention from Israel-Palestine tensions (Petras 2006) .
With the 9/11 complex also comes a trans-Atlantic dispute, the Christopher Hitchens dispute, in which the English assure the Americans: You can keep him. And in increas-ing numbers Americans respond, It's fine; you can have him back. In fact, please take him back!
Representing War
Media reflect -stage manage, produce -the different sides to war. Over time media representations of war, at any rate on the part of war parties, have become more, not less biased because war is increasingly conducted via airspace with media as major arenas of psychological warfare and black information on the frontlines of public opinion.
Media representations in the US particularly of conflicts in the Middle East and adjacent regions and of Israel's policies often diverge from those in the region, clearly so during the neoconservative project of 'transforming the Middle East', as a glance at CNN and, in contrast, Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya and other Mideast media shows. US secretary of state Madeline Albright declaring in 1996 of the death of half a million Iraqi children under five because of US sanctions, 'we think the price is worth it', exemplifies the divide. Secretary of state Condoleezza Rice's statement, as Israel's devastation of Lebanon was underway in August 2006, that 'a new Middle East is being born', was tone deaf to sentiments in the region.
For years Afghan President Hamid Karzai protests at regular intervals that American air raids killing Afghan civilians are unacceptable and intolerable, without noticeable effect on operations. American air raids have spread to Pakistan's border areas and since November 2008 to non-tribal areas such as Bajjaur. In late 2008 Pakistan's prime minister has begun to voice similar criticisms. Meanwhile public perceptions in both countries are that the air operations are part of an arrangement with the Americans and political leaders go through the motions of protesting for legitimacy's sake.
Reporting of the clash between Georgia and Russia in summer 2008 has been onesided; for critical treatments one must search far off the beaten track. Also according to otherwise reasonably independent sources, Russia's intervention in Georgia signals the re-emergence of a totalitarian regime. Philip Stephens (2008a) in the Financial Times compares Russia's actions to those of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. New York Times op-ed columns feature language such as this: 'W. [short for George W. Bush] and Condi are suddenly waking up to how vicious Vladimir is.' Citing Georgia's president Saakashvili's view of Putin ('today we are looking evil directly in the eye'), Maureen Dowd casually uses the language of 'evil ' (2008) . It is a small step from rehearsing unexamined assumptions to war mongering. Months later, in autumn 2008, reports emerged, among others via the BBC, that Georgia's forces had used indiscriminate violence against civilians and homes in South Ossetia, which Russia responded to with proportional restraint -the opposite of the account that had been circulating for months. By the time these reports emerged the story was long off the front pages and the rites of indignation had come and gone. It takes little for mainstream media to slip into established narratives but it takes a lot to self correct and to break narratives, a lot more than is usually available.
Reporting on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan is extensive but biased. Regarding Darfur the public knows about the 'Janjaweed' and images of parched stretches of land, but has little information about problems of water that underlie ethnic strife and conflicts with Chad. The International Criminal Court indicts Sudan's head of state for genocides of three tribes that the general public has never heard of. The hiatus between these charges and public knowledge shows the gap in reporting.
Overusing Celebrity Narratives
By following Bob Geldof and Bono, Angelina Jolie and Madonna as tour guides to world problems, media offer comic book versions of world problems and relief and adopt tabloid views of globalization. This to the dismay of social movements and NGOs who for decades have sought to present images of Africa emancipated and empowered and not as an object of charity.
That media use and create celebrity is ordinary; stardust and glamour serve as emotional glue and media offer emoticons with celebrities as props. Locales, regions and nations are extended families of sorts and media provide their narratives. Through incessant repetition national narratives attain 'thruthiness' in the sense of generating a common sense. That celebrities and movie actors take up global engagement and articulate social responsibility is welcome and at times their ideas are smarter and more grounded than their media representations (cf. Richey and Ponte 2008 on the Product RED campaign). What is problematic, however, is media overusing celebrity to the point of distorting global relations. Thus, western discussions have been dominated by Gleneagles promises of debt relief for Africa, which a few years later turn out to be largely unmet. Discussions of international development have long been dominated by the Millennium Development Goals. A pattern is that the declaration of new targets and goals diverts attention from the circumstance that past targets have not been met. In response to Geldof and Bono escapades, entrepreneurs and investors note that by making Africa look like an object of charity they reduce the actual interest in investing in Africa. This is not where the energy is and this is not why the ship has been turning. Asian investment in Africa has been rising significantly. The main driver, of course, has been rising demand for commodities, but an additional factor is that, unlike the west, China and India have not been burdened by the mortgage of denigrating representations. Growth in several African countries has risen to 6 percent -after 'lost decades' of marginal or negative growth -largely due to demand and investments from the NICs in the south. The World Bank reports that 'for the first time in three decades African economies are growing with the rest of the world', which fuels 'hopes of new business era in Africa' (World Bank 2007; Russell 2007 ). Africa 'is at the heart of the latest surge of enthusiasm to hit emerging markets. If we compare media north and south, the general tenor in media in the global south is more positive about the growing role of the south, more concerned with south-south cooperation, more impatient with the postwar power structure and more critical of western bias, as glancing at Al Jazeera or Al Arabiya programs or leafing through Frontline, Dawn, Al Ahram, Daily Star, Uno Mas Uno or La Jornada shows. The common experience of western colonialism and neocolonialism obviously plays a role. Media in the south are also more aware of the ironies of western bias. Thus, the Times of India reports the story of a US Senator outsourcing a speech on the globalization of Oregon to a firm in Bangalore, India. 8 Another trend in media in the global south is a growing assertiveness. According to Chandran Nair, 'Speak up, Asia, or the west will drown you out': 'What is needed is the emergence of a confident body of Asian intellectual leaders ' (2007) . A Reuters story in the Hindustan Times is headlined 'Stop lecturing us, India tells rich nations'.
The time has come for the developed world to attend to its own problems, and stop lecturing emerging economies about what is right and what is wrong, Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram said on Monday. As growth looks sure to slow in much of the rich world, partly due to the fallout from reckless lending in the United States, new economic powerhouses like India say they are tired of being told what to do. "For too long the advanced economies have told the developing economies that this is right and this is wrong", Chidambaram told Reuters on the sidelines of the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. But his biggest criticism was of financial authorities in developed countries for not keeping up with the new and complex financial market instruments that lay behind recent credit market turmoil. "Their regulators have fallen behind. They are beginning to rethink their regulatory structure", he said. "I am told in the UK there is urgent consideration of the fact that response is divided between three separate institutions -the Financial Services Authority, the Bank of England and the government. They want to know where the buck stops", he said. "In the name of innovation, regulators or governments in the advanced economies have fallen behind the curve", he said. "The lesson is that the model we have adopted, cautious calibrated opening of the economy, is perhaps the right model." "Regulation must stay one step ahead of innovation", he added.
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Another instance of the south talking back is China's human rights report on the United States. Drawing on Human Rights Watch, FBI reports, etc., the report criticizes American violent crime, its large prison population, police brutality, restrictions on workers' rights to unionize and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 10 Meanwhile, in one area at least mainstream media north and south tend to agree. 'Blessed are the poor' according to one of the prophets, but not according to the world's media, north and south. In the north, economic migrants or jobseekers from the south are easy targets for discrimination and accusations of crime. In the south, crime and disease are associated with poverty (e.g. Davis 2006). Middle class sensibilities and glitzy marketing aesthetics prevail in most of the world's media (see Berger 2008) .
BC/AC
Discussed above are major global divides that media uphold in the early twenty-first century. Whether media merely reflect and follow or create divides is a question that cannot be addressed here. Mainstream media underestimate and under-represent the rise of the rest. In this respect they differ from business media -which are keen to identify 'new champions' (e.g. Sirkin et al. 2008 ) and in whose interest it is to do so, whether from the point of view of investment or competition. They differ also from intelligence agencies -CIA and American defense intelligence reports have long identified the major economic and power realignments to come, 11 but they don't make popular reading. Mainstream media in representing the rise of the rest as a threat send the message if globalization isn't ours, then it isn't. As long as this is the common sense in the west, it suggests the diagnosis 'does not play well with others'.
Their representation of new emerging globalization meets the needs of conservative, complacent societies, a bourgeois response that enables bourgeois repose. It keeps horizons near and flat. How would conventional wisdom come to terms with the ironies of history? How would media represent self criticism and reflexivity? For all their influence, media are often windows of clichés, corridors of conventional wisdom, knowledge without depth, with occasional smart or probing editorial comments. Perspectives such as the American bubble and the European bubble vent regional narratives of power. To the extent that media are bubble media -display windows of collective narcissism in which world events figure as sidebars to national narratives -they institutionalize regional comfort zones.
The crisis of 2008, however, has been a major game breaker and wakeup call for the 'masters of the universe'. There are marked differences in public discourses before and after the crisis, BC and AC. The discussion above portrays BC views.
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Twenty-first century shifts manifest to a large extent as economic shifts with finance as a salient dimension and sovereign wealth funds as key players. The sovereign wealth funds mainly come from two sources, surplus accumulated through exports of manufactures, as in Japan, China and Korea, and energy exports, with the Arab Emirates and Norway in the lead, followed by other oil exporters. Before the crisis, perspectives on sovereign wealth funds followed the general American pattern of distrust of state institutions. In 2005 the US congress vetoed China's CNOOC's bid to acquire the oil company Unocal. In 2006 congress overruled the Dubai Ports World holding company taking over the management of six US ports. Larry Summers voices the philosophy underlying this distrust. According to Larry Summers, sovereign wealth funds 'shake the logic of capitalism': 'governments as shareholders … may want to see their national companies compete effectively, or to extract technology or to achieve influence ' (2008) . What is wrong, actually, with governments seeking to build the national economy? In Europe industrial policy has been the norm; in East Asia the developmental state has been the path to success. But in the US the default ideology is 'free enterprise' and government 'picking winners' is taboo in the American business ethos. Thus, Summers implicitly upholds a singular, American notion of capitalism and condemns forms of mixed economy. Obviously this American position is no longer tenable with banks, insurance companies such as AIG and Detroit automakers turning to government for support. The criticism that SWFs follow political rather than economic objectives doesn't hold when politics and economics are no longer clearly distinguishable. Philip Stephens notes, 'Broken banks put the state back in the driving seat' and 'government is no longer a term of abuse' (Stephens 2008b) .
After the crisis, the story lines begin to change. Their changing course also reflects five years or so of petrol prices close to $100 a barrel (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , so oil exporters are flush. The story is essentially simple: 'Sovereign funds put cash in the banks ' (Financial Times, November 28, 2007) . Funds from China to the Arab Emirates buy stakes in Wall Street banks. As the China Investment Corporation buys a 10 percent stake in Morgan Stanley for $5 billion and a 10 percent share of Blackstone, 'the fund sees a unique opportunity in the credit crisis of developed markets' (Anderlini 2007) . It is not just Abu Dhabi buying Manhattan's Chrysler building or sovereign wealth funds from China and Singapore buying into Wall Street power houses; it is that the accumulation patterns have changed. The portée of the intervention of sovereign wealth funds is that the 2008 crisis ushers in the comeback of state regulated capitalism. At one stage sovereign wealth funds are shunned, next they are reluctantly allowed in, then they are embraced, next they are actively sought after, expected to take part in and drawn into institutions, or reprimanded for not taking part -much of this in the course of a year. Daniel Gross sums up the unfolding plot:
With U.S. banks and financial institutions retrenching in the wake of the subprime debacle, cash-seeking American hedge funds, private-equity firms and corporations will be booking passage for Beijing and Bahrain. "They [SWFs] have almost replaced U.S. pension funds as the principal source of capital for alternative investments", says Michael Klein, chairman of Citigroup's investment-banking unit.
The rising pace of SWF investment in blue-chip American companies will provoke plenty of angst. SWFs operate with a Cheneyesque opacity. Americans tend to imagine free trade and globalization as McDonald's in Riyadh and shoe factories in Vietnam producing cheap goods. But governments of nondemocratic countries in the Persian Gulf and Asia owning big chunks of America's financial infrastructure? Not so much. (Gross 2007 (Gross -2008 Consider the shifting nuances in the headlines and story lines in the western business press from 2007 through 2008, at times with contradictory signals even on the same page or in the same article.
• 'Big spenders: how sovereign funds are stirring up protectionism' (J. Willman) and 'Markets eye the new rich kids on the block' (J. Chung, Financial Times, July 30, 2007) .
• 'A passage to the west for sovereign wealth funds' (J.F. Vail, Financial Times, October 31, 2007).
• 'Officialdom finds a new, unprincipled bogeyman' (J. Dizard, Financial Times, November 27, 2007) .
• 'Sovereign funds should lend support to equities' (Financial Times, December 13, 2007) .
• 'Why SWFs will not fix the western financial mess' (T. Jackson, Financial Times, December 17, 2007).
• 'Credit crunch led to rapid rise of sovereign wealth fund investment in US and European banks': since January 2007 Singapore's Temasek spent $41.7 billion (in stakes in Merrill Lynch and Barclays), the UAE $10.7 billion and China $8 billion (Financial Times, March 24, 2008 ).
• 'IMF clears way for development of sovereign wealth funds code' (Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2008) .
• 'The wealth of nations is reflected in the stellar rise of sovereign wealth funds' (Financial Times, March 31, 2008 ).
• 'The new global wealth machine' (New York Times, April 2, 2008 ).
• 'Do not panic over foreign wealth ' (G. Rachman, Financial Times, April 29, 2008 ).
• 'Reject sovereign wealth funds at your peril' (Financial Times, June 6, 2008 ).
• 'SWFs attract controversy but are part of the global solution' (Arnab Das, Financial Times, July 23, 2008 ).
• 'Managers eye Asian SWF billions' (Financial Times, August 4, 2008) .
• 'Fifth of SWFs "unaccountable"' (Financial Times, September 15, 2008 ).
• 'Global Investment: Exec Desperately Seeks SWF. Must be rich. No green card or English required. Send photos and balance sheets to Wall Street' (Gross 2007 (Gross -2008 .
There is a parallel to these changes in representations in the growing charm with Islamic finance instruments, with London, Amsterdam and other financial centers queuing up to provide the new instruments (Sullivan 2008) . This echoes the pattern of Eurodollars in the 1970s with a twist: western institutions seeking to retrieve and corner the money that has gone into paying for the west's energy habits.
Initially the emerging economies appeared to be safe from the impact of crisis, 13 but gradually slackening demand not only in the US but also in Europe has begun to impact on emerging economies' exports. Nandan Nilekani who heads India's Infosys, adds a further twist: 'we were riding on a global liquidity boom'. 'Remove the "steroid", as is happening now, and 2-3 percent of growth will go'. So the crisis also comes as a corrective in emerging economies: 'After a few years of 8 percent plus growth, we felt that we were already a superpower. We took credit for global factors, and took the foot off reforms' (Nilekani 2008) .
The crisis has accelerated the transition from the G8 to the G20. Initiated by French president Sarkozy, the G20 summit in November 2008 edges towards a new global balancing act including a greater role for major emerging societies. A Dutch newspaper headline during the summit reads, soberly, matter-of-factly, 'G20 waits for new leader, preferably one with money'.
14 The awareness that the American hegemon is bankrupt is spreading.
The declining value of American assets through 2008 -such as Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Washington Mutual -cost the sovereign wealth funds that went in early dearly. A November headline reads, 'sovereign funds go cold on rescue finance'. 15 Given continued uncertainty, sovereign wealth funds have become much more cautious. In turn, this has increased the political pressure for their involvement.
The ambivalent rise of sovereign wealth funds in western media -tinged with anxiety and greed -is paralleled in changing representations of the 'rise of Asia'. After the crisis the rise of the rest is gradually being represented in a slightly more positive light and we can probably anticipate more such changes. After all, one day the 'new champions' might be called to the rescue. A cover headline in The Economist asks 'Can China save the world? ' (November 15-21, 2008) . The question mark prevails, of course, but what is new is the question. It signals that the entire landscape has changed radically. If the IMF is to resume its role of stabilizing international finance it can only do so with new inflows of funds, in particular from Saudi Arabia and China. Hence a headline reads 'UK confident Saudis will help IMF' (Financial Times, November 3, 2008 
